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The phenomenon of shared intention has received much attention in the 
philosophy of mind and action. Margaret Gilbert (1989, 2000c, 2014b) argues that 
a shared intention to do A consists in a joint commitment to intend to do A. But we 
need to know more about the nature of joint commitments to know what exactly 
this implies. While the persistence of joint commitments has received much 
attention in the literature, their impersistence has received very little attention. In 
this paper, we shed light on the impersistence of joint commitments by showing 
how joint commitments can be dissolved by unexpected events. 
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Since the late 1980s, collective or shared intentionality has been the subject of 
sustained discussion in the philosophy of mind and action. Important early 
contributions include Bratman (1992, 1993), Gilbert (1989, 2000c), Searle (1990), 
and Tuomela and Miller (1988). Most of the discussion is focused on the 
intentionality of joint action, i.e. on the shared intentionality expressed by a 
sentence such as “We intend to go for a walk together.” Some argue that the 
intentionality of joint action can be given a reductive account and understood in 
terms of individual intentionality (e.g., Tuomela and Miller 1988; Bratman 1993, 
1999; Tuomela 2005). Michael Bratman, for example, holds that individual 
intentions of the form “I intend that we A” are the basis of the intentionality of joint 
action (1993, 106).  
While Bratman gives an account of shared intentions in terms of individual 
intentions, others argue against such reductive accounts (e.g., Searle 1990; Meijers 
2003; Roth 2004; Gilbert 2014b). Margaret Gilbert denies that a shared intention 
to do A has as its core personal intentions to do A together. On her account, it is not 
even necessary for X and Y to share an intention to do A that either personally 
intends that they do A (2014b, 102–6). She argues that a shared intention to do A 
consists in a joint commitment to intend as a body to do A. When and only when 
the members of some group G are jointly committed to intend as a body to do A, do 
they have a shared intention to do A according to Gilbert. For the parties to be 
jointly committed to intend as a body to do A, they must be jointly committed to 
emulate, by virtue of the actions of each, a single body that intends to do A. Gilbert 
labels her account “the plural subject account of shared intention,” since those who 
are jointly committed to something constitute what she calls a “plural subject” 
(2014b, 114–18). 
Joint commitments form the corner stone of Gilbert’s account of social phenomena 
as it has been developed since her 1989 book On Social Facts. Not only can there be 
joint commitments to intend as a body to do something. There can also be joint 
commitments to believe as a body that something is the case, to accept as a body a 
particular rule, and so on. Hence, a joint commitment is the commitment of a group 
as one body to do something where ‘do’ is to be understood in a very broad sense 
so as to include intend, believe, accept, etc. This means that a joint commitment is 
the commitment of a group to emulate, by virtue of the actions of all, a single doer 
of that thing. Note that this does not require the participants to be personally 
committed to what the group is committed to. For example, the group can be 




On Gilbert’s account, a joint commitment is formed when the group members have 
expressed their personal willingness to be party to it, if only tacitly, and this is 
common knowledge between them. When a joint commitment has been formed, 
each party to the joint commitment has an obligation towards the others to act in 
accordance with the commitment. If one of them violates the joint commitment, the 
others gain the standing to rebuke her and may sometimes even exclude her from 
the group (Gilbert 2014b, 118). A joint commitment can only be rescinded with the 
concurrence of all the parties and individual parties to the commitment cannot 
rescind from it unilaterally without getting the others’ permission. Gilbert thus 
writes that “when two or more persons are jointly committed to intend as a body 
to do X, then if either wishes to act contrary to the intention, they will need to get 
the permission of the other parties to the joint commitment so to act, or they will 
be – in one respect – at fault” (2003, 47). Consequently, joint commitments can be 
very persistent and act as strong behavioral constraints on Gilbert’s account. They 
incline people to act in certain ways to avoid the risk of rebuke for violating them. 
To motivate that a shared intention to do A consists in a joint commitment to intend 
as a body to do A, Gilbert offers the example of Queenie and Rom who intend to do 
some shopping together in a neighboring town. In order to get to the shops before 
they close, they must walk at a certain pace. But when they are halfway there, 
Queenie begins to lag behind. In a tone of mild rebuke Rom says, “Can you hurry up 
a bit? We won’t be able to get any shopping done at this rate!” Queenie says “Sorry!” 
and catches up to him. She stops only a little later, however, and announces, “That’s 
it! I’m not going any further!” Gilbert writes that, “Rom is likely to be taken aback. 
Whatever he says, his thoughts may well run along these lines: ‘You can’t just 
decide to stop here, not just like that!’” (2014b, 106). Gilbert suggests that this is 
because Queenie is violating an obligation she has towards Rom by virtue of their 
shared intention to go shopping together. Had Queenie sought his permission to 
stop and said something along the lines of “Do you mind that I stop here?” his 
reaction would have been different (2014b, 105–11). According to Gilbert, this 
suggests that Queenie and Rom’s shared intention consists in a joint commitment 
to intend as a body to do some shopping together. 
Gilbert’s own work emphasizes the persistence of joint commitments. She has 
written almost nothing about the impersistence of joint commitments, although 
she acknowledges the importance of examining this topic (we return to this in the 
next section). One may thus easily get the impression that joint commitments are 
more persistent than they actually are.1  
 
1 Gilbert (2000a) also focuses on the implications of the persistence of joint commitments 
when examining the role of joint commitments in science. She argues that joint 
commitments to beliefs in a certain sense play a negative role in science. Scientists who are 
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In this paper, we shed light on the impersistence of joint commitments. We shall 
assume that Gilbertian joint commitments exist and provide an extension, not a 
revision, of Gilbert’s account of joint commitment. In doing so, we focus on situated 
joint commitments and discuss how joint commitments behave relative to each 
other and as instances of one social phenomenon among other social and natural 
phenomena (such as division of labor or physical conditions). We argue that an 
unexpected event under some circumstances indirectly dissolves a joint 
commitment by enabling one or more parties to the joint commitment to violate it 
without the risk of rebuke. How persistent a joint commitment is in the face of an 
unexpected event depends on the nature of the unexpected event and the 
circumstances and content of the joint commitment.  
By providing a fuller picture of joint commitments, we are able to respond to at 
least some of the criticism raised against the plural subject account of shared 
intention. Some philosophers have suggested that it is implausible that rescinding 
a shared intention requires concurrence on everyone’s part (Roth 2011, sect. 2; 
Schweikard and Schmid 2013, sect. 3.3). However, as we will argue, participants in 
a joint commitment can under some circumstances violate the commitment 
without the risk of rebuke and its violation often dissolves the commitment. Hence, 
while rescinding a joint commitment requires concurrence on everyone’s part, 
dissolving a joint commitment does not. This provides a response to the criticism 
that rescinding a shared intention does not require concurrence on everyone’s part, 
since the critics seem to make no distinction between ‘rescinding’ and ‘dissolving’ 
a shared intention.  
Others have criticized the obligations of conformity that shared intentions generate 
on the plural subject account. Gilbert claims that these obligations are absolute in 
the sense that they persist as long as the corresponding joint commitment persists 
(1996, 299). According to the critics, such absolute obligations are not necessary 
for a shared intention (Bratman 1999, 125–29; Tuomela 2005, 332–33; Alonso 
2009, 445–47). In particular, many believe that the no-unilateral withdrawal 
condition is too strong (cf. Roth 2011, sect. 4). While obligations inhere in joint 
commitments and thus in Gilbertian shared intentions, our argument that these 
obligations can sometimes be violated without the risk of rebuke may also provide 
a line of defense against the criticism that absolute obligations in Gilbert’s sense 
are not necessary for a shared intention.  
Consequently, the described criticisms of the plural subject account of shared 
intention do not necessarily give us reason to reject this account. In general, this 
 
participants in a joint commitment to some belief are obligated not to question that belief 
and this may incline them to ignore recalcitrant evidence. Joint commitments to beliefs thus 
come to act as a brake on scientific change on Gilbert’s account.  
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paper strengthens the plural subject account of shared intention by shedding new 
light on the level of persistence of joint commitments. But we do not want to argue 
that the plural subject account is necessarily the most adequate account of the 
general phenomenon of shared intention. Tollefsen and Dale (2012) convincingly 
argue that we may need all of the accounts of shared intention mentioned above to 
understand the complex phenomena of shared intention and joint action. Tollefsen 
and Dale argue that lower-level cognitive processes give rise to and are influenced 
by the type of higher-level processes described in the philosophical accounts of 
shared intention and, one would expect, give rise to a variety of them. A next step 
is to empirically test the philosophical accounts using cognitive data. For this 
reason, the implications of having a joint commitment to intend something are 
worthy of examination even if the plural subject account does not adequately 
capture the general phenomenon of shared intention. 
 
2. Gilbert on the Impersistence of Joint Commitments 
Gilbert has focused on the persistence of joint commitments and written very little 
about the impersistence of joint commitments. While a joint commitment cannot 
be rescinded unilaterally by any one party, she writes that “in some cases there may 
be special background understandings or explicit preliminaries that allow, in effect, 
for unilateral rescindability [of a joint commitment]” (2014a, 40). She does not go 
into details with how such special circumstances can be characterized and seems 
to have in mind primarily two-party cases in which one party has beforehand 
explicitly reserved the right to rescind from the joint commitment (see, e.g., 1996, 
293–95; 2000c, 35, n. 36; 2003, 42–44; 2014a, 40, 54, 65; 2014b, 106–7). This 
allows, in effect, for unilateral rescindability of the commitment, since there are 
only two parties to it. To give an example of “special background understandings” 
that in effect allow for unilateral rescission of a joint commitment, Gilbert modifies 
the example of Queenie and Rom who intend to do some shopping together. In this 
version of the example, “Queenie is not sure she wants to walk all the way into town 
that afternoon, so before she and Rom set out on their shopping expedition she gets 
him to agree in advance that if at any time she feels like stopping, she is free to do 
so” (Gilbert 2014b, 107). In this case, Queenie can just decide to stop and not go 
any further. She has no obligation towards Rom to keep walking. 
Parties to a joint commitment can of course choose to violate it, as Queenie does in 
the original story when she just declares that she will not go any further. However, 
it is not clear what a violation of a joint commitment amounts to in terms of the 
persistence of the joint commitment. Gilbert has said very little about this, but she 
acknowledges that, “Exactly what a violation achieves in terms of the persistence 
or otherwise of a given joint commitment needs careful consideration” (Gilbert 
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2014a, 32). It is this “careful consideration” that we intend to provide in this paper. 
Gilbert inclines to the view that “generally speaking violation by one or more 
parties renders a joint commitment voidable by the remaining parties, as opposed 
to immediately voiding it” (Gilbert 2000b, 48, n. 8; cf. Gilbert 1996, 14–15). In two-
party cases, violation thus renders a joint commitment unilaterally voidable by the 
party who has not violated the joint commitment. However, Gilbert notes that there 
are indeed cases where the violation of a joint commitment “destroys” the 
commitment. The example she gives is that of X and Y who jointly commit to the 
plan that X will go to the beach with Y today and Y will go to the movies with X 
tomorrow. If X violates the joint commitment, Y will have no obligation in the 
relevant sense to go to the movies with X, i.e. in the sense of being bound by a 
commitment that she cannot remove on her own. This is true of all two-party cases 
where each party has effectively only one thing to do in order to meet the joint 
commitment (Gilbert 1996, 14). 
 
3. Impersistence Due to Unexpected Circumstances 
In this and the following two sections, we examine the level of persistence of a joint 
commitment to intend as a body to do A. For the sake of brevity, we will speak of a 
joint commitment to do A as shorthand for a joint commitment to intend to do A.  
The impersistence of joint commitments stems from the fact that joint 
commitments are established and retained in a context that is subject to change. In 
this section, we illustrate through an example the impersistence of joint 
commitments when faced with an unexpected event.  
Suppose that Alex, Brian, and Corinne one morning jointly commit to make lasagna 
bolognese together at Brian’s house that night. We will later refer to this joint 
commitment as JC1. Each of them then has an obligation towards the others to act 
in accordance with their joint commitment to make lasagna bolognese on this night. 
This involves, among other things, an obligation for Alex and Corinne to go to 
Brian’s house that night. But suppose that the weather takes a surprising turn for 
the worse as a violent storm comes through, rendering the roads treacherous and 
prompting authorities to advise people to stay indoors. It seems that Alex and 
Corinne would run no risk of rebuke by not going to Brian’s house in these 
circumstances. In other words, their joint commitment to make lasagna bolognese 
together will not work as a behavioral constraint in the face of this unexpected 
event.  
It may be argued that the most straightforward interpretation of this is that Alex, 
Brian, and Corinne have jointly committed to make lasagna bolognese together on 
the implicit condition that doing so will not put their lives in danger. They would 
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never have committed to meet that night had they known about the violent storm. 
Consequently, when the condition fails, this by itself dissolves their joint 
commitment. We would then say that the background conditions for their joint 
commitment have failed and the commitment been dissolved. Alex and Corinne run 
no risk of rebuke by not going to Brian’s house simply because they are not 
violating a joint commitment. But this leads to an unwanted asymmetry. Had Alex 
lived in the same apartment building as Brian, the two of them could have held on 
to the joint commitment to make lasagna bolognese together that night. In this case, 
the joint commitment is not immediately dissolved and Corinne’s not coming to 
Brian’s house strictly speaking amounts to a violation of the joint commitment. 
Thus, this interpretation has the unfortunate consequence that Corinne’s action 
will be characterized differently depending on the situation Alex is in. Furthermore, 
Gilbert explicitly writes that the parties to a joint commitment “are in a position to 
keep [the commitment] in existence through whatever changes in the 
circumstances” (1996, 299; italics added).2 Hence, claiming that joint commitments 
are conditional in the described sense is inconsistent with Gilbert’s account, so if 
we do so, one may reasonably ask whether we are still talking about Gilbertian joint 
commitments.   
There is another interpretation of why Alex and Corinne run no risk of rebuke by 
staying home that avoids these two problems. The unexpected storm has not 
immediately dissolved their joint commitment to make lasagna bolognese, but the 
fact that Alex and Corinne will risk their lives if they attempt to go to Brian’s house 
has given rise to a moral obligation for Brian to waive his right to rebuke them if 
they violate the joint commitment by not going. Since Brian is morally obligated to 
waive his right to rebuke Alex and Corinne for violating the joint commitment, they 
will have no hesitancy in doing so. Their violation of the joint commitment, in turn, 
immediately dissolves it, since there is no one left for Brian to make lasagna 
bolognese with. In this case, there is no impetus for Alex and Corinne to keep the 
joint commitment in existence. The unexpected event may still be said to have 
dissolved the joint commitment, although it has not done so directly, but indirectly 
by way of violation. Note that, given this interpretation, Corinne’s not coming to 
Brian’s house amounts to a violation of the joint commitment whether or not Alex 
lives in the same apartment building as Brian.  
Two qualifications are in order. First, it is not the unexpected stom that by itself has 
given rise to a moral obligation for Brian to waive his right to rebuke Alex and 
Corinne if they violate the joint commitment. It is the fact that, given the unexpected 
storm, it is no longer reasonably possible for Alex and Corinne to meet the joint 
commitment. In other words, insofar as the storm makes it so that it is no longer 
 
2 In the example, this implies that Alex, Brian, and Corinne may agree to defy the weather 
and hold on to their joint commitment. 
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reasonably possible for them to get to Brian’s house, Brian is morally obligated to 
waive his right to rebuke them, which makes it safe for them to violate and thus 
dissolve the joint commitment. Had Alex and Corinne had access to a storm-proof 
vehicle that could transport them safely to and from his house, the situation would 
be different. Alex, Brian, and Corinne’s joint commitment to make lasagna 
bolognese together at Brian’s house would seem to obligate Alex and Corinne to 
make use of this access. As long as it is reasonably possible for Alex and Corinne to 
get to Brian’s house, they are likely to act in accordance with the joint commitment 
and thus keep it in existence. In this sense, the joint commitment is persistent and 
forceful enough to bring into play several ways to make the dinner happen. 
Second, what makes the joint commitment impersistent in the face of the 
unexpected event is strictly speaking that Alex and Corinne expect it to be safe to 
violate the commitment by thinking that it will be clear to Brian that he has a moral 
obligation not to rebuke them. We have picked an example in which the moral 
obligation on Brian’s part is so obvious that this is likely what will happen. With 
respect to many other changes in circumstances, it will be less clear whether Brian 
has such moral obligation or rather whether Alex and Corinne will think it safe to 
assume that Brian believes that he has such moral obligation. In such cases, Alex 
and Corinne will be unlikely to just violate the joint commitment, which will thus 
be more persistent. Such changes in circumstances are more likely to give rise to a 
collective reevaluation of the joint commitment or to Alex and Corinne asking Brian 
for permission to violate the joint commitment. Our aim is to describe a mechanism 
of dissolution of joint commitments, so exactly who will think what when is not so 
important. Still, it is important to emphasize that the level of persistence of a joint 
commitment depends on the moral intuitions of the parties to the commitment. 
 
4. Persistence in Spite of Unexpected Circumstances 
In the last section we examined the impersistence of joint commitments when faced 
with an unexpected event. But sometimes a joint commitment will be persistent in 
spite of being faced with an unexpected event. In this section, we illustrate this 
through an example. 
Gilbertian joint commitments, even joint commitments to do something bad, 
always involve obligations to act in accordance with them. But the obligations that 
inhere in joint commitments are of a special type; they are not moral obligations 
(Gilbert 2014b, 112–13). Gilbert writes that these non-moral obligations “need not 
lead to uncritical compliance” (1996, 299). One may even be morally required to 
violate a joint commitment. With this in mind, Gilbert emphasizes that, “Moral 
considerations can surely ‘override’ joint commitments in terms of what rationality 
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requires one to do” (Gilbert 2014a, 91). Gilbert does not go into detail with what 
this means in terms of the persistence of joint commitments, but she clearly 
acknowledges here that moral obligations have some ability to make joint 
commitments impersistent. In the previous section, we showed that there is 
another sense in which this is true: Group members may violate a joint 
commitment because the others are morally obligated to waive their right to 
rebuke them.  
Gilbert has not examined the ability of moral obligations to do the opposite, to make 
joint commitments more persistent. In the example from the previous section, 
moral obligations are of no use in keeping the joint commitment (JC1) in place in 
the face of the violent storm. Absent special circumstances, such as access to a 
storm-proof vehicle, Alex and Corinne have no moral obligation to try to get to 
Brian’s house in spite of the storm. Even if they had access to a storm-proof vehicle, 
moral obligations would play no significant role in keeping the joint commitment 
in place. The non-moral obligations inherent in the joint commitment would by 
themselves require that they use this vehicle to go to Brian’s house. But sometimes 
moral obligations play an important role in making joint commitments persistent.  
Suppose that everything is as above, except that Brian is a single father and since it 
is his daughter’s sixth birthday he has invited her 19 classmates to spend the day 
with her. The joint commitment that Alex, Brian, and Corinne have made is the joint 
commitment to make lasagna bolognese for the kids that night. Brian, who also has 
to look after the kids, would not be able to make dinner for them alone. We call this 
joint commitment JC2. In the case of JC2, Alex and Corinne seem to be obligated to 
make an effort to find a safe way of getting to his house in spite of the violent storm. 
Compared with JC1, more is required before we can say that it is not reasonably 
possible to meet JC2. The reason for this is apparently moral obligations that Alex 
and Corinne have towards Brian and the kids. Alex and Corinne are morally 
obligated to help Brian make dinner for the kids who otherwise would not get 
dinner that night. These moral obligations thus increase the persistence of the joint 
commitment.3 As one may be morally required to violate a joint commitment, as 
Gilbert emphasizes, one may also be morally required to really make an effort to 
avoid violating it.  
 
3 It may be suggested that the large obligation towards Brian is mainly non-moral. It would 
then only be the moral obligation towards the kids that plays a significant role in increasing 
the persistence of the joint commitment. This would require that the non-moral obligations 
inherent in JC2 somehow outweigh the non-moral obligations inherent in JC1. But the non-
moral obligations inherent in a joint commitment to do φ are the obligations of each group 
member towards the others to emulate with them a single doer of φ. It is unclear how the 




This example illustrates how a joint commitment is relatively persistent when 
many people depend on the fulfillment of the commitment. A joint commitment is 
similarly persistent when some people depend a lot on the fulfillment of the 
commitment. Imagine, for example, that Brian is on his deathbed and has requested 
to have lasagna bolognese one last time. Alex, Brian, and Corinne have 
consequently jointly committed to Alex and Corinne making lasagna bolognese at 
Brian’s house that night. This would obligate Alex and Corinne to try hard to find a 
safe way of getting to his house. 
What makes the joint commitment persistent in spite of the unexpected event is 
strictly speaking that Alex and Corinne consider themselves to be morally obligated 
to try hard to find a safe way of getting to Brian’s house. Most people would 
presumably do so in the described cases. But in one of the examples the content of 
the joint commitment is quite extreme (cooking lasagna bolognese for 20 kids) and 
in the other example the general circumstances of the joint commitment are quite 
extreme (Brian being on his deathbed). When the content and circumstances of the 
joint commitment are less extreme, it will be less clear to Alex and Corinne whether 
they are morally obligated not to violate the joint commitment. Such cases may well 
instead give rise to a collective reevaluation of the joint commitment. 
 
5. Modifiability of Joint Commitments 
In section 3 and 4, we examined the level of persistence of joint commitments when 
faced with an unexpected event. In this section we want to suggest that a joint 
commitment is sometimes modified rather than just dissolved by an unexpected 
event. We illustrate this through the two joint commitments JC1 and JC2 introduced 
in section 3 and 4, respectively. 
Consider JC1 again. Suppose there is no violent storm and that Alex, Brian, and 
Corinne do meet to make lasagna bolognese that night, but when they open the 
package of meat, they discover that the meat has gone bad. It is Sunday night and 
stores are closed. Similarly to the example presented in section 3, the unexpected 
discovery gives rise to a moral obligation for Alex and Corinne to waive their right 
to rebuke Brian for violating the joint commitment by not providing meat for the 
lasagna. But since Alex and Corinne are morally obligated to waive their right to 
rebuke Brian for violating the joint commitment, he will have no hesitancy in doing 
so; he will not, e.g., go to extremes to try to provide fresh meat. His violation of the 
joint commitment, in turn, immediately dissolves it, since there is no meat to make 
lasagna bolognese with.   
It is not the discovery that the meat has gone bad that by itself has dissolved Alex, 
Brian, and Corinne’s joint commitment to make lasagna bolognese together. It is 
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the discovery that it is not reasonably possible for them to get access to the missing 
ingredient. For example, this would have been reasonably possible if Brian’s 
responsibility of providing the ingredients could have been redistributed to other 
parties to the joint commitment. Had Alex lived next door and had meat in his 
fridge, the joint commitment to make lasagna bolognese would not have been 
dissolved by the unexpected event. The joint commitment would have obligated 
Alex to provide the meat instead of Brian to enable them to meet the joint 
commitment. Thus, this example illustrates how joint commitments can be quite 
impersistent when they involve division of labor in the sense of responsibilities 
given to individual group members that cannot be redistributed to other parties to 
the commitment. 
One may ask whether Alex, Brian, and Corinne are now left with no commitment 
towards each other or whether their joint commitment is replaced by a joint 
commitment to something similar to making lasagna bolognese that night. Joint 
commitments are clearly flexible to some extent. It is often unimportant that a joint 
commitment cannot be fulfilled to the letter. If we are jointly committed to go to 
the candy store on the corner to buy 20 mint drops, but it turns out that they only 
have 19, we still seem to be jointly committed to buy the 19 mint drops or to go to 
the candy store on the next corner to buy 20. In the remainder of this section we 
elaborate on this intuition.  
We suggest that when Alex, Brian, and Corinne jointly committed to make lasagna 
bolognese together that night, they were at the same time implicitly making the 
more general joint commitment to cook together that night.4 We may say that their 
joint commitment JC1 to make lasagna bolognese together that night has a 
substructure of a more general joint commitment JC1* to cook together that night. 
The reason for this is that Alex, Brian, and Corinne still appear to have a joint 
commitment to cook together after they have discovered that the meat has gone 
bad and no longer have a joint commitment to make lasagna bolognese. For 
example, it seems that Brian would have the standing to rebuke Alex and Corinne 
if they do not stay and cook with him. Each of them has acted in accordance with 
their joint commitment to make lasagna bolognese together that night; they have 
declined any invitation to coinciding activities, Brian has tidied his house and 
opened a bottle of wine, Alex and Corinne have taken the bus to Brian’s house, and 
so on. When it turns out that they cannot make lasagna bolognese, this is not by 
itself enough to render their efforts futile, for it is the cooking together and not the 
cooking lasagna bolognese that is most central to the activity they have explicitly 
committed to. We suggest that a joint commitment to a relatively general activity 
 
4 Gilbert briefly mentions that people can make more than one joint commitment “at one 
and the same time by one and the same pair of expressions” (2014b, 122–26).  
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can thus arise when the joint commitment explicitly made is to a less general 
activity.5  
It follows that the joint commitment to make lasagna bolognese together can 
dissolve without the more general joint commitment to cook together dissolves. In 
addition, the joint commitment to cook together may exist latently and only really 
become manifest once the joint commitment to make lasagna bolognese is 
dissolved. But the opposite does not hold: If Alex, Brian, and Corinne’s joint 
commitment to cook together that night was dissolved – for example by a terrible 
storm that forced Alex and Corinne to stay home – then their narrower joint 
commitment to make lasagna bolognese together that night would be dissolved as 
well. For, if it is not reasonably possible for Alex, Brian, and Corinne to cook 
together, then it is not reasonably possible for them to make lasagna bolognese. We 
may think of Alex, Brian, and Corinne’s two joint commitments as a two-tiered 
wedding cake where the top tier represents the more specific joint commitment to 
make lasagna bolognese together that night and the bottom tier represents the 
more general joint commitment to cook together that night. It can be useful to think 
of the joint commitments in this way, for if we take away some tier from a wedding 
cake, we also take away any tier above it, while any tier below it remains. Likewise, 
if the bottom (and more general) joint commitment dissolves, the top (and more 
specific) joint commitment dissolves as well, but the opposite is not true; the top 
joint commitment can dissolve without the bottom joint commitment doing so. The 
bottom tier or the bottom joint commitment is thus the most persistent part of the 
structure. This picture is also suitable because the joint commitment to the most 
general activity is represented by the widest tier. 
Suppose something similar happens in the case of JC2. Brian has bought the 
ingredients needed to make lasagna bolognese for 20 people, but when he opens 
the large package of meat, he discovers that the meat has gone bad. We suggest that 
there is, underlying JC2, a more general joint commitment JC2* to cook dinner for 
the 20 kids for reasons parallel to those just given. While moral obligations made 
JC2 quite persistent in the face of the violent storm, they do not do so here. Alex, 
Brian, and Corinne are morally obligated towards the kids to make them dinner 
that night, not to make them lasagna bolognese. It is thus JC2* whose persistence 
in the face of unexpected events is directly increased by these moral obligations. 
But when an unexpected event is only a challenge to JC2 insofar as it is a challenge 
to JC2* – as is the case with the violent storm – any moral obligation that increases 
the persistence of JC2* in the face of the unexpected event also increases the 
persistence of JC2: As long as it is reasonably possible to meet JC2* in spite of the 
unexpected event, it is also reasonably possible to meet JC2. In particular, as long 
 
5 Note that JC1* is only as persistent as JC1 in the face of the violent storm from the previous 
section. This is why we did not introduce JC1* there. 
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as it is reasonably possible for Alex, Brian, and Corinne to get together to cook in 
spite of the violent storm, it is reasonably possible for them to get together to make 
lasagna bolognese. But the discovery that the meat has gone bad is not an 
unexpected event of this type. This event obligates Alex, Brian, and Corinne to try 
hard to find a way of making dinner for the kids, but does not thereby push them 
to find a way of getting fresh meat. The unexpected event thus dissolves JC2 unless 
they have quite easy access to fresh meat in spite of the stores being closed. Hence, 
while JC2* by being more general is already more persistent than JC2 in the face of 
unexpected events, moral obligations further increase the difference in persistence 
between JC2* and JC2. Compared with JC1* more is required before we can say of 
JC2* that it is not reasonably possible to meet it. 
Under some circumstances, JC1* and JC2* may lead Alex, Brian, and Corinne to a 
joint commitment whose content is very similar to that of JC1 and JC2, respectively. 
Suppose that Brian, in the case of either JC1 or JC2, has invested quite some time in 
the planned joint activity of making lasagna bolognese. He may, e.g., have spent 
time making the lasagna pasta sheets himself. After having discovered that the 
meat has gone bad, Brian finds in his fridge some fresh vegetables and suggests to 
Alex and Corinne that they make lasagna vegetariana instead of the planned 
lasagna bolognese. Given Brian’s efforts and their joint commitment to cook 
together that night, it would seem morally inappropriate for Alex and Corinne to 
decline. If Alex and Corinne agree to make lasagna vegetariana, we may say that the 
joint commitment to make lasagna bolognese turns into a joint commitment to the 
very similar activity of making lasagna vegetariana. We are thus given a new 
version of the two-tiered structure of joint commitments, where the joint 
commitment that forms the basis of the structure in both versions is the joint 
commitment to cook together that night. 
To conclude, if we are right that some joint commitments are modifiable in the 
sense described in this section, the dissolution of a joint commitment will 
sometimes be almost unnoticeable. In some cases, the joint commitment may just 
become replaced by another joint commitment that is very similar or at least 
somewhat similar to it. Still, it is important to recognize the modifiability of joint 
commitments as a form of impersistence of joint commitments. 
 
6. Conclusion 
To sum up, we have argued that unexpected events often indirectly dissolve joint 
commitments by giving rise to moral obligations to waive the right to rebuke group 
members for violating the joint commitments. Sometimes they appear to be 
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replaced by similar joint commitments. Hence, joint commitments and the 
corresponding obligations to conform to them can thus be quite impersistent.  
It should be emphasized, however, that we are not claiming that joint commitments 
are generally highly impersistent. For example, we have shown how moral 
obligations can also help keep joint commitments in existence in spite of 
unexpected events. Hence, our account does not imply that individual joint 
commitments cannot unify people into persistent social groups. Furthermore, we 
have suggested that a joint commitment sometimes forms part of a relatively 
persistent, modifiable structure of joint commitments. It is then this structure that 
preserves the unity of the group, rather than any one joint commitment. 
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